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shall domestic criminal justice 
systems reap from coercive human 
rights? 
Mattia Pinto* 
“They that sow the wind, shall reap the whirlwind” (Hosea 8:7) 
I. Introduction 
In general, we tend to think of  human rights bodies as moderating and restraining state penal policies. 
These institutions appear to have ‘humanised’ criminal justice, by upholding and strengthening procedural 
and substantive rights to protect the individual from the state’s arbitrary use of  criminal mechanisms.1 
However, human rights bodies have also worked to expand penality.2 In recent years, they have 
increasingly interpreted their mandate in monitoring compliance with human rights conventions as 
comprising the imposition of  state obligations in criminal matters.3 In particular, the European Court of  
Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed ample case law demanding that states criminalise, prosecute and 
punish serious human rights violations, and avoid acts of  ‘criminal clemency’ (decriminalisation and 
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1 Substantive rights include, for instance, the provisions that crimes and punishment must be established by law, the 
prohibition of  inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and the prohibition upon unlawful or arbitrary 
detention. Procedural rights include the right to a fair trial, the presumption of  innocence and the need to prove the 
guilt of  the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 
2 In this article, I use ‘penality’ to refer to the entire penal sphere, including its laws, sanctions, institutions, practices, 
discourses and representations. See, eg, D Garland, Punishment and Welfare: A History of  Penal Strategies (Gower 1985) x; 
D Garland, ‘Penality and the Penal State’ (2013) 51 Criminology 475, 476. 
3 See generally M Pinto, ‘Awakening the Leviathan through Human Rights Law – How Human Rights Bodies Trigger 
the Application of  Criminal Law’ (2018) 34 Utrecht Journal of  International and European Law 161; A Seibert-Fohr, 
Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (Oxford University Press 2009). 
2 
amnesty laws).4 The result is the emergence of  a jurisprudence of  ‘coercive human rights law’, whereby 
rights and freedoms at once humanise and enhance state penal practices.5 
Some attention has been devoted in the literature to the evolution toward coercive human rights in human 
rights bodies’ case law, and its immediate effects for the theory of  both human rights and criminal law.6 
Yet, there is little to no analysis on how this jurisprudence affects domestic criminal justice systems. 
Aiming to fill this gap, this article assesses some actual and potential implications that the ECtHR’s duties 
to deploy the criminal law (might) have on domestic legal systems. It shows that the Court tends to 
present criminal accountability as indispensable to protect human rights. This approach may foster a 
‘culture of  conviction’ at the domestic level whereby punishment is seen as the end to pursue whatever 
the cost.7 While the ECtHR’s jurisprudence currently refers to the duty to punish as an obligation of  
means, increased concern with the efficiency of  criminal justice systems in preventing crime is leading 
the Court to consider whether adequate punishment has been imposed. Such an invocation of  penal 
measures may have adverse implications in practice at the domestic level. Through the case study of  the 
Modern Slavery Act (MSA), adopted in England and Wales in 2015, this article illustrates how domestic 
authorities may appropriate the language of  coercive human rights to foster and legitimise penal 
expansion. The MSA appears to be heading toward a more repressive criminal justice system, with 
 
4 See, eg, K Kamber, Prosecuting Human Rights Offences: Rethinking the Sword Function of  Human Rights Law (Brill 2017). 
5 F Tulkens, ‘The Paradoxical Relationship between Criminal Law and Human Rights’ (2011) 9 Journal of  International 
Criminal Justice 577, 538. 
6 See, eg, Pinto (n 3); Tulkens (n 5); F Tulkens, ‘Human Rights as the Good and the Bad Conscience of  Criminal Law’  
in S Snacken and E Dumortier (eds), Resisting Punitiveness in Europe (Routledge 2012); M Sorochinsky, ‘Prosecuting 
Torturers, Protecting Child Molesters Toward a Power Balance Model of  Criminal Process for International Human 
Rights Law’ (2009) 31 Michigan Journal of  International Law 157; Seibert-Fohr (n 3); L Lazarus, ‘Positive Obligations and 
Criminal Justice: Duties to Protect or Coerce?’ in L Zedner and JV Roberts (eds), Principles and Values in Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 2012); Kamber (n 4). 
7 The idea that coercive human rights may encourage a ‘culture of  conviction’ was firstly exposed, in the context of  the 
Inter-American Court of  Human Rights, by F Mégret and JP Calderón, ‘The Move Towards a Victim-Centred Concept 
of  Criminal Law and The “Criminalization” of  Inter-American Human Rights Law: A Case of  Human Rights Law 
Devouring Itself ’ in YHaeck, O Ruiz-Chiriboga and C Burbano-Herrera (eds), The Inter-American Court of  Human Rights 
Theory and Practice, Present and Future (Intersentia 2015) 438. 
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growing limitations on due process rights (for both defendants and victims of  crime), harsher 
punishments and wider powers of  arrest and detention. Conversely, criminal justice reform initiatives, 
directed at reducing unnecessary criminalisation and implementing alternatives to prison, are totally 
neglected.  
This chapter is divided as follows. The first section presents current trends of  penal expansion in Europe. 
Drawing on a number of  influential texts on the ‘carceral turn’ in contemporary society,8 it connects the 
growing punitive tendencies in European states with the widespread assumption that criminal law can 
help address pressing social problems. The second section outlines the ECtHR’s case law on coercive 
human rights and considers how the Court has laid the groundwork for promoting a ‘culture of  
conviction’ at the domestic level. The last section uses the MSA as a case study to investigate how 
domestic criminal justice systems may react to coercive human rights. Ultimately, it is argued that the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence has encouraged an expansion of  penality in the UK under a benevolent guise 
that masks the oppressive effects of  extensive powers to criminalise and punish. 
 
II. Rise of  the penal state in Europe 
Several studies have observed a rise of  punitiveness in the western world since the 1980s.9 This 
phenomenon, characterised by a decline of  rehabilitative ideals, growth in incarceration rates, expanded 
application of  criminal sanctions and increased police control, concerns not only the United States, but 
 
8 On the ‘carceral turn’ in US and Western European societies, see generally E Bernstein, ‘Carceral Politics as Gender 
Justice? The “Traffic in Women” and Neoliberal Circuits of  Crime, Sex, and Rights’ (2012) 41 Theory and Society 233, 
236. 
9 See, eg, D Garland, The Culture of  Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Clarendon 2001); J Pratt, The 
New Punitiveness: Trends, Theories, Perspectives (Willan Pub 2005); J Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime 
Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of  Fear (Oxford University Press 2007); L Wacquant, Punishing the 
Poor: The Neoliberal Government of  Social Insecurity (English language ed, Duke University Press 2009). 
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also, to a lesser extent, certain European countries.10 The ever-expanding punitive outlook of  
contemporary democracies has raised great concern among progressive activists and scholars, who have 
long believed that reliance on criminal law and punishment should be as limited as possible. The history 
of  criminal law is indeed largely a history of  abuses and cruel practices.11 Criminalisation and punishment 
constitute the most severe forms of  state interference with the individual’s private sphere, and penal 
power, when increased, is prone to abuse and injustice.12 
In the influential book The Culture of  Control, David Garland critically examined these trends, by 
presenting a historical-cultural account of  strategies of  crime control since the 1970s in the United States 
and in the UK.13 He illustrated how a new ‘culture of  control’ has risen and expanded in these two 
countries. This ‘culture of  control’ is characterised by two patterns of  action: a strategy of  prevention 
and partnership between state and non-state agencies, and a strategy of  ‘punitive segregation’ aimed at 
harsher punishment and more incapacitation.14 Garland singled out several examples of  this 
phenomenon, including mandatory sentencing laws, more proactive and preventive policing efforts, 
harsher penalties, emphasis on ‘the victim’ as justification for more severe responses to crime, increased 
concern with prevention, harm-reduction and risk management, community notification laws and 
offenders’ registers, private policing, zero tolerance policies and Anti-Social Behaviour Orders.15 Garland 
 
10 S Snacken, ‘Resisting Punitiveness in Europe?’ (2010) 14 Theoretical Criminology 273. 
11 N Jareborg, ‘What Kind of  Criminal Law Do We Want’ in Annika Snare (ed), Beware of  Punishment: On the Utility and 
Futility of  Criminal Law, vol 14 (Pax Forlag 1995) 18. 
12 PH Van Kempen (ed), Criminal Law and Human Rights (Ashgate 2014) xi. 
13 Garland, The Culture of  Control (n 9). 
14 ibid 139–146. 
15 ibid ch 6-7. 
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also suggested that, despite considerable variation from place to place and some exceptions, other western 
industrialised nations appeared to be heading down the same path.16 
This is also the position of  Loïc Wacquant. For the French sociologist, ‘the explosive growth of  the scope 
and intensity of  punishment’ also affected Western Europe.17 In Punishing the Poor, Wacquant reconnected 
this phenomenon to the global expansion of  neo-liberalism, which has been imported into the European 
continent from the United States and has transformed the welfare state into a penal one.18 According to 
Wacquant, the ‘European road’ to punitiveness (with French, Dutch, Italian and other variants) is 
characterised by social and penal policies that seek to regulate those on the margins of  society.19 Welfare 
services and punitive interventions are combined for the purpose of  supervising, controlling, 
criminalising and punishing ‘the poor’. The French sociologist observed that in Europe the ‘penalization 
of  poverty’ is mainly driven by the police and the courts rather than the prison.20 Elements of  the 
European punitive tendency are the upsurge of  police intervention, the escalation of  penalties for 
repeated offences, the subordination of  social services to judicial authorities, and the extension of  powers 
to arrest and detain.21  
The punitive trends described by Garland and Wacquant sped up in the wake of  the attacks of  11 
September 2001.22 On both sides of  the Atlantic, several countries adopted numerous counter-terrorism 
 
16 ibid 91. 
17 Wacquant (n 9) xvi. 
18 ibid 20–21. 
19 ibid 24. 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid pt 4. 
22 E Dumortier et al, ‘The Rise of  the Penal State: What Can Human Rights Do About It?’ in Sonja Snacken and Els 
Dumortier (eds), Resisting Punitiveness in Europe (Routledge 2012) 109–110. 
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measures that bolstered their penal systems. Western democracies passed laws aimed at facilitating arrests 
and detentions and at reducing defendants’ rights whilst increasing governmental powers to interfere with 
individuals’ privacy and private life.23 However, the rise of  the penal state has involved not only tangible 
developments within the criminal justice system, but also more punitive attitudes at the level of  social 
and political discourse. This phenomenon involves a growing sensibility about revenge by crime victims,24 
renewed attention toward ‘popular’ demands of  punishment,25 diffusion of  images of  insecurity by the 
media,26 and political initiatives promoting ‘law and order’ thinking.27 The normal citizen is transformed 
into a victim of  crime, whose vulnerability requires a greater resort to criminalisation and penal severity.28 
The underlying assumption is that criminal sanction is an effective tool for reducing crime, providing 
justice and solving complex social issues. It is a form of  ‘penal optimism’,29 summed up by the assertion 
that ‘prison works’.30 This punitive fervour attracts not only ‘law and order’ politicians but at times also 
 
23 See generally G Agamben, State of  Exception (University of  Chicago Press 2005) 3; B Evans, Liberal Terror (Polity Press 
2013). 
24 I Aertsen, ‘Punitivity from a Victim’s Perspective’ in S Snacken and E Dumortier (eds), Resisting Punitiveness in Europe 
(Routledge 2012). 
25 See generally J Pratt, Penal Populism (Routledge 2007); A Bottoms, ‘The Philosophy and Politics of  Punishment and 
Sentencing’ in CMV Clarkson and R Morgan (eds), The politics of  sentencing reform (Clarendon Press 1995). 
26 Simon (n 9) 135. 
27 R Reiner, Law and Order: An Honest Citizen’s Guide to Crime and Control (Polity Press 2007). 
28 P Ramsay, The Insecurity State: Vulnerable Autonomy and the Right to Security in the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 
2012) 228; Simon (n 9) 76. 
29 CM Webster and AN Doob, ‘Penal Optimism: Understanding American Mass Imprisonment from a Canadian 
Perspective’ in KR Reitz (ed), American Exceptionalism in Crime and Punishment (Oxford University Press 2017). 
30 The phrase was coined by former British Home Secretary Michael Howard in a speech at the British Conservative 
Party conference on 6 October 1993 (‘Let us be clear. Prison works. It ensures that we are protected from murderers, 
muggers and rapists, and it makes many who are tempted to commit crime think twice.’). See C Brown, ‘Howard Seeks 
to Placate “Angry Majority”: Home Secretary Tells Party’ The Independent (7 October 1993) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/howard-seeks-to-placate-angry-majority-home-secretary-tells-party-that-
balance-in-criminal-justice-1509088.html> accessed 16 December 2019. 
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liberal and progressive movements (victim advocates, feminist activists and ecological groups), which 
view the penal system as a tool of  social reform and a protection for vulnerable individuals.31  
The rise of  the penal state has not involved every European country in the same way. As Sonja Snacken 
reports, some states ‘do not easily fit this bleak vision of  punitiveness’.32 While in certain countries 
imprisonment rates have grown steadily (the UK, Spain, the Netherlands, France), in others the prison 
population has remained stable (Scandinavian countries, Germany) or has even decreased (Eastern 
European countries).33 In this regard, it has been observed that levels of  punitiveness are to be correlated 
with welfare investment and political economy,34 but also with different democratic political structures.35 
Moreover, for some authors, if  Europe has never achieved the same level of  punitiveness as the United 
States, this is due to the different role that human rights law has played in the two contexts.36 The 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is often mentioned as one of  the barriers against an 
uncontrolled expansion of  penality.37 According to Denis Salas, for instance, the monitoring role of  the 
 
31 AJ Do Amaral, ‘The Penal Policy of  Human Rights’ (2013) 1 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 61, 61; 
quoting ML Karam, Recuperar o Desejo Da Liberdade e Conter o Poder Punitivo, vol 1 (1st edn, Lumen Juris 2009) 4; H 
Aviram, ‘Progressive Punitivism: Notes on the Use of  Punitive Social Control to Advance Social Justice Ends’ (2019) 
UC Hastings Research Paper No 364 <www.ssrn.com/abstract=3404276> accessed 16 December 2019. 
32 Snacken (n 10) 274. 
33 ibid.  
34 N Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies (Cambridge University Press 
2008). 
35 T Lappi-Seppälä, ‘Explaining National Differences in the Use of  Imprisonment’ in S Snacken and E Dumortier (eds), 
Resisting Punitiveness in Europe (Routledge 2012). 
36 Dumortier et al (n 22) 113. 
37 Snacken (n 10) 283. 
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ECtHR is a key factor in explaining the more humane and moderate penal and sentencing polices in the 
European continent.38 
It is probably true that ECtHR case law has somewhat constrained the penal actions of  European states. 
Examples that are often reported are the abolition of  the death penalty, the protection of  prisoners’ 
rights, the prohibition of  indefinite detention, the decriminalisation of  homosexuality and the protection 
of  freedom of  expression against undue criminalisation.39 Nonetheless, the jurisprudence of  the ECtHR 
is also ambivalent. Not only has the Court at times hesitated to counter expansive national penal policies, 
but in some other cases it has backed or even promoted the introduction of  new criminal offences, more 
policing powers, the institution of  criminal proceedings and harsher punishments. 
 
III. ECtHR case law on coercive human rights 
A. State obligations in criminal matters 
The ECtHR has developed a robust body of  case law requiring states to deploy their domestic criminal 
law to counter human rights violations and protect the rights and freedoms enshrined in the ECHR.40 As 
Laurens Lavrysen has shown in his chapter, 41 the duty to have recourse to criminal law solutions generally 
has two strands. First, the Court demands that states criminalise conduct that harms individuals’ liberties. 
 
38 D Salas, La Volonté de Punir : Essai Sur Le Populisme Pénal (Hachette Littératures 2008) 124–140; mentioned in Dumortier 
et al (n 22) 113. 
39 Dumortier et al (n 22) 114–120. On freedom of  expression, see also Stephanos Stavros’ chapter in this volume. 
40 Kamber (n 4); S Manacorda, ‘“Dovere Di Punire”? Gli Obblighi Di Tutela Penale Nell’era Della Internazionalizzazione 
Del Diritto’ in M Meccarelli, P Palchetti and C Sotis (eds), Il lato oscuro dei diritti umani: Esigenze emancipatorie e logiche di 
dominio nella tutela giuridica dell’individuo (Universidad Carlos III De Madrid 2014); Lazarus (n 6). 
41 See Laurens Lavrysen’s chapter in this volume. 
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Second, it requires that effective criminal law mechanisms (investigation, prosecution and punishment) 
are put in place and pursued effectively as enforcement tools of  human rights provisions.  
The ECtHR has provided for the duty to criminalise in relation to Articles 2, 3, 4 and 8 ECHR.42 Given 
the scope of  this chapter, I shall focus here only on Article 4. In Siliadin v France, for instance, the Court 
censured French law for not providing sufficient and effective criminal law protection against 
‘servitude’.43 The case involved a Togolese girl who had worked for four years as a domestic servant for 
a married couple without remuneration or freedom of  movement. The ECtHR found that Article 4 
ECHR ‘must be seen as requiring the penalisation and effective prosecution’ of  ‘any act aimed at 
maintaining a person’ in a situation of  slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour.44 Similarly, in CN 
v United Kingdom, the Court found that the Government’s failure to properly investigate the complaints 
of  domestic servitude made by the applicant, a woman who had travelled to the UK from Uganda, was 
due to the absence of  specific legislation criminalising such a wrongdoing.45 In Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, 
the victim, a Russian woman, had been trafficked from Russia to Cyprus for reasons of  sexual 
exploitation and the European judges extended the protection offered by Article 4 to trafficking in human 
beings.46 As a result, states are required to adopt measures intended to prevent trafficking, protect victims, 
and criminalise and punish traffickers.47 
 
42 X and Y v Netherlands Series A no 91 (1986) 8 EHRR 235, para 27; MC v Bulgaria (2005) 40 EHRR 20, paras 150 and 
174; Kiliç v Turkey (2001) 33 EHRR 58, para 62; Cestaro v Italy App No 6884/11 (ECtHR, 7 May 2015) para 246; CN 
and V v France App No 67724/09 (ECtHR, 11 October 2012) para 105. 
43 Siliadin v France (2006) 43 EHRR 16, para 89. 
44 ibid para 112. 
45 CN v United Kingdom (2013) 56 EHRR 24, para 81. 
46 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia (2010) 51 EHRR 1, para 282. See also Chowdury and Others v Greece App No 21884/14 
(ECtHR, 30 March 2017) para 86. 
47 Rantsev (n 46) para 285. 
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The ECtHR also orders states to enforce their criminal law.48 The Court has recently clarified that, in 
cases of  serious violence such as assaults for racial reasons or police ill-treatment, civil compensation or 
administrative proceedings are not enough and prosecution is required.49 The European judges have tried 
to attenuate this provision by clarifying that ‘[t]he obligation to conduct an effective investigation is an 
obligation not of  result but of  means’.50 However, this qualification is rendered immaterial when the 
judges hold that the institution of  criminal proceedings cannot be detached from their ‘issue naturelle’, 
namely the punishment of  those responsible.51 In the Court’s opinion, ‘not doing enough to prosecute 
and punish those responsible’ and confining the state’s reaction to the mere payment of  compensation 
makes any investigation ineffective in practice.52 In Ali and Ayşe Duran v Turkey, the European judges 
explained that ‘[w]hile there is no absolute obligation for all prosecutions to result in conviction or in a 
particular sentence, the national courts should not under any circumstances be prepared to allow life-
endangering offences and grave attacks on physical and moral integrity to go unpunished’.53 Finally, the 
ECtHR insists that those responsible for serious human rights violations should serve a severe sentence.54 
 
48 Öneryildiz v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20, para 94; Ali And Ayşe Duran v Turkey App No 42942/02 (ECtHR, 8 May 2008) 
para 61. 
49 Movsesyan v Armenia App No 27524/09 (ECtHR, 16 November 2017) para 74; Jeronovičs v Latvia App No 44898/10 
(ECtHR [GC] 05 July 2016) para 105; OR and LR v Moldova App No 24129/11 (ECtHR, 30 October 2018) para 77. 
50 Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey App No 24014/05 (ECtHR [GC], 14 April 2015) para 173. 
51 Nasr and Ghali v. Italy App No 44883/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2016) para 272. 
52 Jeronovičs (n 49) para 105; Gäfgen v Germany (2011) 52 EHRR 1, para 119. 
53 Ali And Ayşe Duran v Turkey (n 48) para 61. See also Öneryildiz (n 48) para 96; Jelić v Croatia (2015) 61 EHRR 43, para 
77. 
54 OR and LR v Moldova (n 49) para 79 (the ECtHR considered that five years’ imprisonment was a too lenient sentence 
in a case of  police ill-treatment).  
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In the Court’s view, the duty to resort to criminal law would lose much of  its meaning if  perpetrators 
were punished with too lenient a sanction.55 
Where the ECtHR is confronted with situations of  human rights abuses of  a certain gravity (eg, torture, 
killings, trafficking and forced labour, as well as domestic and sexual violence), criminal justice appears 
as an indispensable element of  human rights protection and promotion. The underlying rationales are 
mostly deterrence, prevention, and adherence to, or restoration of, the rule of  law.56 For the Court, 
criminal law safeguards society as a whole by ending impunity and providing general human rights 
protection.57 The ECtHR also has a tendency to require criminal accountability in the interests of  
individual victims. In Jelić v Croatia, for instance, the European judges noted that ‘among the main purposes 
of  imposing criminal sanctions [is] retribution as a form of  justice for victims’.58 Even if  the Court has 
yet to recognise the victim’s right to have criminal proceedings instituted against third parties,59 criminal 
law mechanisms are to be available to those affected by serious human rights violations.60 As Krešimir 
Kamber has persuasively contended, the victim has a ‘right-claim to the application of  criminal law 
mechanisms’ without any flaws or culpable failures in the process.61 This tendency is clearly visible in Al 
Nashiri v Romania and Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania, where the ECtHR held that ‘the notion of  an “effective 
 
55 Nikolova and Velichkova v Bulgaria (2009) 48 EHRR 40, para 62 (the ECtHR held that punishing police ill-treatment 
resulting in death with suspended terms of  imprisonment amounted to a violation of  Article 2 ECHR).  
56 Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28, para 128. 
57 OR and LR v Moldova (n 49) paras 58-59. 
58 Jelić (n 53) para 90; El-Masri v FYROM (2013) 57 EHRR 25, para 192. 
59 Movsesyan v Armenia App 27524/09 (ECtHR, 16 November 2017) para 62. See also Mazepa and Others v. Russia (2019) 
68 EHRR11, para 69. 
60 Pulfer v Albania App No 31959/13 (ECtHR, 20 November 2018) para 87. 
61 Kamber (n 4) 507. 
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remedy”’ for the victim entails criminal proceedings ‘leading to the identification and punishment of  
those responsible’.62 
 
B. Encouraging a ‘culture of  conviction’ 
Throughout its case law, the ECtHR has maintained that criminalisation, prosecution and punishment of  
certain abuses are required to secure human rights. In so doing, the Court shows a great confidence in 
the deployment of  penal powers and gives criminal law a positive outlook, as a painkiller to redress social 
and moral harms.63 The gravity of  the harm caused and the seriousness of  the abuses committed also 
contribute to presenting criminal law as the obvious and self-evident instrument to respond to serious 
human rights violations. Critical arguments concerning the risks of  over-criminalisation are, on the other 
hand, dismissed.64 
The European judges appear to regard criminal law solutions as the principal and most effective ways to 
prevent grave ECHR breaches and give redress to victims. Currently, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence refers 
to the duty to punish and prosecute as obligations of  means. However, increased concern with the 
effectiveness of  the criminal justice system in preventing crime and impunity is leading the Court to 
ultimately consider whether adequate punishment has been, or could have been, imposed.65 When 
criminal justice systems are criticised, it is usually because they are not effective enough in securing 
convictions and punishments. In Nasr and Ghali v Italy, for example, Italian investigators and judges had 
 
62 Al Nashiri v Romania (2019) 68 EHRR 3, para 706; Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania App No 46454/11 (ECtHR, 31 May 2018) 
para 673. 
63 Similarly, in the context of  the IACtHR, DR Pastor, ‘La Deriva Neopunitivista y El Desprestigio Actual de Los 
Derechos Humanos’ [2006] Jura Gentium <http://www.juragentium.org/topics/latina/es/pastor.htm> accessed 16 
December 2019. 
64 Tulkens (n 6) 157. 
65 Similarly, Sorochinsky (n 6) 186. 
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identified and convicted those responsible for the ‘extraordinary rendition’ of  the Egyptian imam Abu 
Omar.66 The ECtHR also acknowledged that the investigations had been ‘effective et profonde’.67 However, 
Italy was found in violation of  the Convention because it had created a situation of  impunity by not 
punishing some of  the convicted persons.68 Clearly, the Court’s concern here is not with the adequacy of  
the process but rather with the efficiency of  results. Only the imposition of  an adequate (ie non-lenient) 
punishment on those deemed responsible is considered as an effective remedy.69 On the other hand, 
absence of  criminal accountability is regarded as a human rights violation per se.70 The assumption that 
a general atmosphere of  impunity contributes to the commission of  further crimes has led Judge Ksenija 
Turković to assert that passivity in prosecuting ‘may be equated with complicity’.71 For this reason, the 
Court appears to be willing to accommodate various limitations to the principle of  fair trial,72 statutes of  
limitations and acts of  criminal clemency when they are perceived to foster impunity.73  
The insistence on coercive human rights also has the effect of  pulling non-punitive remedies into the 
criminal justice orbit. While the Court at times demands states to combine criminal law with a wide range 
of  other social and legislative measures, the latter tends nonetheless to be conceived within a criminal law 
 
66 Nasr and Ghali (n 51). 
67 ibid para 272. 
68 ibid. Italy never sought the extradition of  the CIA agents who had been convicted and the Italian President of  the 
Republic pardoned three of  them. 
69 Atalay v Turkey App No 1249/04 (ECtHR, 18 September 2008) para 46. 
70 El-Masri (n 58) para 192. 
71 K Turković, ‘International and National Courts Confronting Large-Scale Violations of  Human Rights’ (2016) 
<www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20160129_Turkovic_JY_ENG.pdf> accessed 16 December 2019 (speech at 
a seminar for the opening of  the ECHR’s judicial year in 2016). 
72 See Kelly Pitcher’s chapter in this volume. 
73 Opuz v Turkey (n 56); GIEM Srl and Others v Italy App Nos 1828/06, 34163/07, 19029/11 (ECtHR [GC], 28 June 2018) 
para 260; Marguš v Croatia (2016) 62 EHRR 17, para 139. 
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paradigm.74 By the same token, victims’ protection is mostly to be ensured by means of  criminal 
proceedings and even restorative measures are incorporated into the existing punitive framework. As 
stated in Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, states have positive obligations to put in place an appropriate 
legislative and administrative framework, to ensure the enjoyment of  human rights, to take protective 
measures on behalf  of  victims, to investigate human rights breaches, and to cooperate with each other 
in cases of  cross-border violations.75 Although the preventive and protective measures that, according to 
the ECtHR, should accompany criminal law mechanisms are not strictly ‘penal’ in nature, it is primarily 
for criminal justice institutions (police, prosecutors, criminal courts) to implement and enforce them. As 
a result, the focus shifts from protection and compensation to prosecution and punishment. In August v 
United Kingdom, for example, the applicant, a minor, complained that his rights under Article 8 ECHR had 
been violated because he had not been awarded compensation as a victim of  prostitution.76 The Court 
rejected his claim, arguing that the conviction of  his abuser was a sufficient response to the violation.77  
Commenting on the assertion that the European Court has become a ‘machine that encourages criminal 
inflation’,78 former ECtHR judge Françoise Tulkens contends that ‘while it is true […] that the Court 
sometimes gives in to the questionable charm of  more severe criminalization, the reality is more 
complex’.79 In fact, the Court has not ceased to set restrictions on the use of  penal powers by European 
states. However, the latter function coexists with the other here presented, aimed at holding perpetrators 
 
74 See, eg, Rantsev (n 46) para 284. See also Vladislava Stoyanova’s chapter in this volume. 
75 Rantsev (n 46) paras 286-289. 
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of  human rights violations criminally accountable.80 Coercive human rights are the result of  a certain 
doublethink in the Court’s jurisprudence. While the ECtHR still advances its moderating influence in 
some areas of  criminal law, it has started bolstering and requiring penality in others. In so doing, the 
ECtHR sends an ambiguous message to domestic criminal justice systems, which are required to enforce 
coercive human rights obligations while guaranteeing due process rights or limiting their penal tendency 
in some other contexts.81 It is likely that this mixed message leads to undesirable outcomes. As presented 
in the first section, some European states are already expanding their criminal justice systems with 
troublesome results. Coercive human rights obligations may, in turn, foster a further ‘culture of  
conviction’ whereby punishment is considered as the end to pursue whatever the cost.82 As Liora Lazarus 
has noted, ‘case law is one thing, it is another matter how states and governments translate the messages 
they are hearing from the ECtHR […], and how they are incorporating these messages into the rhetoric 
of  public protection’.83 The danger, far from being hypothetical, is that domestic authorities interpret the 
decisions of  the Court as enabling them to increase the level of  punitiveness. Put differently, domestic 
authorities may take advantage of  the jurisprudence on coercive human rights to enhance penal measures 
to the detriment of  individuals’ freedoms.84 This expansion, at the same time, is easily welcomed into the 
system because it is justified by the language and rhetoric of  rights.85 Growing policing powers, the 
introduction of  new criminal offences and wide-ranging incarceration become acceptable and even 
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desirable if  presented as necessary for rights’ protection. In other words, the Court’s human rights case 
law is used as a leverage for justifying the expansion of  the penal state. 
 
IV. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 
In this section, the MSA is taken as a case study to illustrate how the jurisprudence of  the ECtHR on 
coercive human rights is translated at the domestic level. The Act and its application are analysed to show 
that domestic authorities may appropriate the language of  human rights to foster and legitimise penal 
expansion. Contrary to the opinions of  certain authors,86 it is contended that a rights-based approach to 
complex social problems (eg human trafficking and labour exploitation) – especially when influenced by 
the ECtHR case law – is not in opposition, but rather conducive, to the deployment of  more far-reaching 
criminal law.  
The MSA is an anti-trafficking legislation passed in England and Wales in 2015. It aims to address what 
is commonly called ‘modern slavery’, namely a wide range of  exploitative practices, including slavery, 
forced labour and trafficking in human beings. It does so by strongly relying on criminal law measures, 
such as heavy penalties and provisions to facilitate investigation, prosecution and conviction. The 
underlying justification for the Act is that ‘modern slavery’ is a serious human rights violation that requires 
prompt criminal accountability. The increasingly intertwined relationship between ‘human rights 
problems’ and ‘criminal law solutions’ has been underscored by Theresa May in an article she wrote in 
The Telegraph one year after the enactment of  the MSA:  
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These crimes must be stopped ... This is the great human rights issue of  our time, and 
as Prime Minister I am determined that we will make it a national and international 
mission to rid our world of  this barbaric evil.87 
The case law of  the ECtHR had a prominent influence on the adoption of  the MSA.88 In 2012, the Court 
rendered the judgment of  CN v United Kingdom, involving an Ugandan national who had been forced into 
working as a live-in carer with no significant payment and confiscated identity and travel documents.89 
Recalling a previous decision in Siliadin v France and Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia,90 the ECtHR held that the 
UK legislative framework in place at the relevant time had been inadequate to afford practical and 
effective protection against violations of  Article 4 ECHR.91 The Court also censured as ineffective the 
investigation by the British authorities into the applicant’s complaint of  domestic servitude.92 The UK 
had already introduced the various offences of  ‘slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory labour’ in 
section 71 of  the UK Coroners and Justice Act 2009. However, the ECtHR case law on Article 4 ECHR, 
together with difficulties in enforcement and lack of  clarity of  section 71, fuelled interest in enacting a 
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more comprehensive act,93 which would ‘equip the United Kingdom to fight modern slavery’.94 The MSA 
consolidated and simplified existing offences and increased sentences. The maximum penalty for slavery, 
servitude, forced or compulsory labour and human trafficking is now life imprisonment.95 Additionally, 
the Act provides for a confiscation regime for individuals convicted of  ‘modern slavery’ offences;96 
introduces Slavery and Trafficking Prevention and Risk Orders to restrict the activity of  those who pose 
a risk of  causing harm;97 and establishes an Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner.98 Finally, the Act 
lays down various provisions for the protection of  victims, including a new defence for victims who 
commit an offence,99 as well as a section on transparency in supply chains.100  
The stated purpose of  the MSA is to strengthen criminalisation initiatives, facilitate the work of  law 
enforcement officers and increase prosecution rates.101 The approach adopted builds upon the British 
government’s strategy to counter organised crime and terrorism.102 The regulation of  trafficking and 
exploitation heavily relies on law enforcement and crime control, while the causes of  trafficking and the 
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structural factors that create vulnerability remain unaddressed.103 Arguably, these exploitative factors are 
even promoted by the government, through immigration policies of  exclusion, such as preventing asylum 
seekers from working and tying overseas domestic workers to their employers.104 The assumption is that 
‘modern slavery’ can be ‘solved’ by targeting individual players rather than the social processes that 
normalise exploitation.105 This assumption, among other reasons,106 finds justification in the ECtHR case 
law, which has transformed criminal law into the primary instrument of  human rights protection. 
Criminal law is also used as a communication tool to send a clear message to abusers that their conduct 
is not tolerated. In Theresa May’s words:  
This landmark legislation sends the strongest possible signal to criminals that if  you 
are involved in this vile trade you will be arrested, you will be prosecuted and you will 
be locked up.107  
The focus on crime reduction, deterrence and punishment is in line with, and implements, the UK’s 
international obligations under the UN Trafficking Protocol, the Council of  Europe Convention on 
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the EU Anti-Trafficking Directive.108 But it is also 
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compatible with, if  not required by, the UK’s obligations under the ECHR.109 The jurisprudence of  the 
ECtHR supports rather than challenges the use of  a criminal justice framework to address ‘modern 
slavery’. Section 1(2) of  the MSA is indicative in this respect, when it clarifies that the offence of  slavery, 
servitude, forced and compulsory labour has to be construed in accordance with Article 4 ECHR.110  
Three examples illustrate the limitations of  an act that uses adherence to international obligations as ways 
to justify extensive penality. 
 
A. Sentencing 
First, in terms of  penalties the MSA fully endorses the ‘prison works’ rhetoric. Theresa May’s words are 
again illustrative:  
Offences committed in connection with modern slavery are some of  the most serious 
that can be committed, so the Bill extends the maximum available sentence to life 
imprisonment. That will ensure that the worst perpetrators can receive the lengthy 
custodial sentences that they deserve. Tough sentences will also act as a powerful 
deterrent to others.111 
Although life in prison is yet to be used, existing case law has shown a tendency to impose higher custodial 
sentences.112 In R v Zielienski (David), the offender had conspired with his family to deceive a group of  
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Polish nationals to travel to the UK, on the promise of  a well-paid job.113 They were instead housed in 
appalling conditions and their wages were confiscated. The Court of  Appeal increased a sentence of  four 
years for trafficking offences to seven years, confirming that ‘modern slavery’ offences are to be treated 
with severity.114 First, Lord Justice Davis explained that sentences in cases of  ‘modern slavery’ must make 
clear that ‘every vulnerable victim of  exploitation will be protected by the criminal law’.115 Endorsing the 
judge of  first instance, Lord Justice Davis accepted that there was a ‘clear, obvious and continuing need 
to punish’ traffickers and ‘deter others who would seek to profit from the oppression of  others’.116 Then, 
on this basis, he had no doubt that Zielienski’s sentence was ‘unduly lenient’ and had to be ‘significantly 
increased’.117 
The trend toward higher penalties is even more visible in R v Iyamu (Josephine).118 Iyamu had been convicted 
for having arranged the travel of  five individuals to Europe with a view to exploitation. With one 
exception, all victims had been made aware that they were to work as prostitutes once in Germany and 
Italy. They had been subject to juju rituals, trafficked to Europe and forced to sell their bodies to repay 
their ‘debts’. Iyamu was initially sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment. However, the Court of  Appeal 
found the latter penalty ‘unduly lenient’ and increased it to 18 years’ imprisonment.119 Without wishing 
to assess whether the latter penalty is appropriate, it is important to focus here on the language used by 
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the Court and its emphasis on the need for a ‘severe sentence’.120 The Court of  Appeal described Iyamu's 
lack of  remorse and continued denial of  responsibility for what occurred121 and concluded: 
Overall, therefore, the facts and circumstances of  this case compel the conclusion that 
this sentence, in our judgment, ought to be increased. Offending of  this gravity 
requires condign sentencing. It also requires that persons be deterred from engaging 
in offending of  this kind ... Those who are within the reach of  the jurisdiction of  the 
courts of  England and Wales should expect severe sentencing in this context. Those 
who engage in vicious, ruthless and heartless human trafficking of  this particular kind 
are playing for high stakes. They need to know that the courts will show no mercy when their 
criminality is exposed.122 
 
B. Prosecution of  victims 
Second, a framework heavily focused on crime encourages a rigid dichotomy between victims and 
perpetrators. However, it is not uncommon for people who have been exploited to commit offences or 
become involved in trafficking themselves.123 A criminal record for victims of  ‘modern slavery’ is highly 
detrimental because it would limit their access to lawful employment, have an impact on their immigration 
status and render contact with state authorities less likely in the future.124 In other words, it makes victims 
more vulnerable to further exploitation. A series of  international and European instruments have 
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acknowledged this problem and have encouraged the adoption of  non-punishment clauses for victims 
of  trafficking and labour exploitation.125 In place of  a non-punishment clause, section 45 of  the MSA 
provides for a statutory defence for individuals compelled to commit certain criminal offences as a result 
of  their exploitation.126 The defence does not apply to various crimes, such as sexual offences, offences 
involving serious violence, or robbery and burglary.127  
Despite good intentions, section 45 is problematic.128 First, it is designed not primarily to protect victims 
of  ‘modern slavery’, but to transform them into reliable witnesses who can facilitate the work of  law 
enforcement officers.129 Its stated purpose is to encourage victims to come forward and give evidence 
without fear of  being convicted.130 Second, a criminal law approach to trafficking criminalises victims 
who are compelled to commit offences more often than not, even when a defence is provided. Trafficked 
victims often do not self-identify as having been trafficked and may distrust the authorities and even their 
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lawyer.131 As a result, in the UK victims continue to be prosecuted for offences they were forced to 
commit.132 
The following examples may help illustrate the problem here. The first case is R v Joseph (Verna 
Sermanfure).133 The human rights NGO Anti-Slavery International, acting as intervener, invited the Court 
of  Appeal to reconsider the approach UK courts had taken prior to the enactment of  the MSA in respect 
of  prosecution of  trafficked victims who offended. In five out of  six of  the conjoined appeals, the 
interested parties had been granted the status of  victims of  trafficking after their conviction. Only in two 
cases the Court of  Appeal allowed the appeals and quashed the convictions.134 The judges’ observations 
demonstrate the difficulty of  reconciling the need to protect victims of  trafficking and the duty to 
prosecute ‘modern slavery’ offences in line with the UK’s international obligations.135 According to the 
Court of  Appeal, ‘it is in the public interest to prosecute’ when the crime committed is ‘grave’, regardless 
of  whether the defendant is a victim of  human trafficking.136 The Court, by refusing or dismissing four 
out of  six appeals, arguably favoured the criminalisation of  victims rather than protect them.137 
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Another case is R v GS.138 GS is a Jamaican national who was sentenced in 2007 to seven years’ 
imprisonment for a drug-related offence. She is also a victim of  human trafficking, whose status was 
confirmed by the Home Office. In 2017, GS applied for an extension of  time for leave to appeal against 
conviction claiming it had been an abuse of  process for her trial to proceed. The Court of  Appeal 
acknowledged the material change concerning the treatment of  victims between 2007 and after the 
MSA.139 Nonetheless, Lord Justice Gross refused the application, arguing that victims of  trafficking are 
not exempted from prosecution should the latter be in the public interest, and that this is fully in line 
with the UK’s international obligations.140 He said: ‘[A]s repeatedly made clear, where crimes have been 
committed by [victims of  human trafficking], even arising from their own trafficking, there is no blanket 
immunity’.141 The prosecutor, the judge continued, has a wide discretion to decide whether to proceed 
against a victim of  trafficking.142 According to Lord Justice Gross, GS’s conviction was not unsafe, given 
that she had committed a ‘serious offence’ whose ‘gravity should not be minimised’.143 
From the cases above, it is clear that the statutory defence in section 45 of  the MSA does not afford 
victims any significant protection.144 In fact, it prioritises prosecution over protection.145 Nonetheless, the 
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British government can take advantage of  the rhetoric surrounding the new defence to assert its position 
as a human rights champion.146 
 
C. Risks and preventive orders 
Third, the MSA introduces civil preventive orders to restrict the activity of  individuals who pose a risk 
of  committing ‘modern slavery’ offences. First, courts can grant Prevention Orders against individuals 
convicted under the MSA or not guilty by reason of  insanity who are still at risk of  offending.147 Second, 
courts can issue Risk Orders on the basis of  a generic risk that a person will exploit another one.148 The 
issuance of  these orders is highly discretionary even when the required criteria are met. Should an order 
be granted, the person concerned will be prohibited from doing anything described in it.149 Apart from 
time limits, there are no specific constraints on the severity of  orders, which can have a substantial impact 
on the recipient. Failure to comply, without reasonable excuse, with any of  the prohibitions or 
requirements imposed by such an order is considered a criminal offence.150 Until March 2019, courts in 
England and Wales adopted 119 Prevention Orders and 46 Risk Orders.151 In two cases, the recipients 
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breached one of  the conditions in their orders and were sentenced to three and a half  and two years and 
four months in prison, respectively.152 
While Prevention Orders are contingent upon individuals having already committed a ‘modern slavery’ 
offence, Risk Orders are to be seen as pre-emptive steps based on suspicious events.153 Their introduction 
finds validation in the jurisprudence of  the ECtHR, which requires states to take preventive measures to 
protect individuals from harm by others.154 The British government explicitly invoked these positive 
duties in a memorandum prepared by the Home Office in June 2014 to address the compatibility of  the 
then Modern Slavery Bill with the ECHR.155 However, the asserted necessity of  intervening preventively 
is also used as a leverage to expand the state’s power to coerce and control.156 Prevention and Risk Orders 
may impose harsh coercive measures that are not dissimilar to actual punishment before a harm occurs. 
The content of  the prohibitions is also decided following civil rules of  evidence and not the more 
rigorous criminal ones.157 A custodial sentence may also be imposed if  the conditions of  the orders are 
breached. With the excuse of  providing more security, these orders ultimately afford law enforcement a 
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high degree of  flexibility in controlling and limiting individuals’ liberties. In so doing, they reinforce the 
punitive stance of  the MSA. 
 
D. Supporting a culture of  conviction 
The MSA plays a crucial role within the UK’s strategy to combat crime. The National Audit Office’s 
report Reducing Modern Slavery, published in December 2017, devotes a great deal of  space to the increase 
in recorded crimes, number of  investigations, as well as rates of  prosecutions and convictions.158 The 
focus is on efficiency and crime reduction. This approach has been endorsed by commentators, who now 
assess the success (or lack thereof) of  the British policy on human trafficking by relying on the quantity 
of  criminal trials that have been carried out.159 They decry the (relatively) small number of  prosecutions 
and convictions as they were the main way to assess the UK’s effort to fight ‘modern slavery’.160 However, 
through such an insistence on criminal accountability, the MSA ultimately reveals a tendency toward those 
punitive trends that characterise contemporary democracies and have raised criticism among activists and 
scholars. The MSA shows uncritical reliance on criminal sanctions, a leaning toward long custodial 
sentences and an extension of  preventive police powers. It also combines welfare services and punitive 
strategies to regulate and exclude those on the margins, such as migrants, sex workers and people from 
the poorer classes. A great emphasis on prevention, harm reduction and victims’ protection is used as a 
justification for larger criminal justice institutions and increased power to state officials. Finally, the MSA 
promotes partnerships between corporations, NGOs and individual citizens on the one hand, and the 
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state on the other hand, ‘in order to help reduce criminal opportunities and enhance crime control’.161 
This punitive tendency is worrisome because the UK is already heading toward a more repressive penality, 
with large-scale incarceration, severe punishment and proactive policing strategies.162  
Some elements of  this penal expansion are to be linked to the jurisprudence on coercive human rights. 
Of  course, beyond the requirements of  human rights law, there are various interests and rationales that 
play a role in the criminalisation of  human trafficking. The ECtHR can hardly be considered the main 
reason behind the UK’s approach to ‘modern slavery’ and its narrow focus on criminal justice responses. 
However, the contribution of  human rights in facilitating criminal justice responses cannot be 
overlooked. The ECtHR’s insistence on effective criminal enforcement motivates policing and 
prosecutorial responses rather than efforts to understand and deal with situations of  systemic injustice, 
in which global inequality, immigration controls and exploitative labour conditions all play a part.163 
Coercive human rights obligations support and strengthen the MSA’s crime control machinery, whilst 
deflecting attention, energy and resources from initiatives in the opposite direction. The ECtHR 
promotes an individualistic approach whereby social issues can be solved by tackling single acts of  abuse 
and violence. As a matter of  fact, this attitude tends to disregard alternative, noncriminal responses to 
‘modern slavery’, such as inclusive immigration policies or labour regulation.164 By the same token, the 
Act marginalises calls for criminal justice reforms aimed at reducing custodial sentences or 
decriminalising less serious infractions. Even accepting that human rights-driven criminalisation has not 
directly increased the net of  social control, it has nonetheless normalised criminal law as the default 
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answer to human trafficking, whilst limiting any room for change. While the ECtHR might not be the 
direct cause of  a statute centred on ‘crime’ rather than on victim protection and structural causes of  
exploitation, its jurisprudence has sustained this approach by providing a human rights rationale for 
crime-control measures. The confidence shown by the ECtHR in calling for criminalisation, prosecution 
and punishment has given criminal law a new legitimacy as the ‘sharp edge of  the sword’ of  human 
rights.165 It has also favoured the illusion that criminal management is the answer to problems that are 
commonly acknowledged as complex and multifaceted. Coercive human rights, when transposed at the 
domestic level, confer power to the state in pursuing punitive agendas by invoking better protection for 
victims and compliance with international obligations. At the same time, they neutralise critique about 
the current conditions of  imprisonment or the current policing of  borders.166 Harsh prison sentences, 
greater power to prosecute and convict, and extensive pre-emptive measures become acceptable and even 




It is often argued that the ECtHR is partly responsible for constraining European states’ penal policies 
and supporting a more ‘humane’ criminal law. While this may in fact be true, the Court has also 
contributed to sustaining certain punitive impulses, through its coercive human rights obligations. When 
the ECtHR orders states to resort to criminal law, human rights protection is advanced to bolster penality. 
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However, the European judges have generally failed to ponder the potential pitfalls of  their jurisprudence. 
They have shown a sort of  ‘criminal fetishism’, which overlooks the risks associated with penal expansion 
and underestimates the fact that criminal law always poses a threat to the individual’s freedoms.168 Even 
in cases of  abuses of  a certain gravity, uncritical reliance on criminal law instruments is problematic if  it 
disregards crucial considerations on the opportunity and implications of  deploying penal measures. As 
the case of  the MSA has illustrated, national reforms led by coercive human rights turn out to extend 
and give legitimacy to forms of  penal control, while failing to tackle the root causes of  abuses and protect 
victims. 
In conclusion, coercive human rights obligations appear to have a dual function: they require new penal 
intervention, but they also legitimise punitiveness by covering it up with a humane veil. While activists 
and scholars have generally condemned the expansion of  penality led by ‘law and order’ rhetoric, such 
expansion is instead demanded when criminal law is used in the name of  human rights. The same 
individuals who criticise harsh prison conditions and overcriminalisation in the context of  counter-
terrorism or ‘tough on crime’ policies, are often advocates of  extensive penal control to stop human 
trafficking, protect the right to life and prohibit torture.169 By endorsing criminal accountability as the 
best instrument to protect human rights, the ECtHR has given strength to this form of  cognitive 
dissonance, which, depending on the case, sees penality as problematic or benevolent. But it has also 
offered European states a new excuse to have recourse to ever more expansive criminal law with little 
criticism and in a way that seems consistent with progressive thinking. 
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